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To : 25X1A 3 February 1950  
From :   
Subject : Discussion of Prerequisites for Intelligence Production Planning

1. This committee has been asked to make recommendations on a plan for the production of intelligence needed to support the policy-making bodies of the government. An examination of this task which confronts the committee leads directly to three questions which it would be well to answer in order to gain understanding of the nature of a suitable plan. These questions are:

- a) What policy-making bodies of the government should the intelligence production of CIA support?
- b) What intelligence is needed by such bodies?
- c) What proportion of such intelligence can be planned?

2. a) There is probably general agreement within the committee on Mr. Stout's statement that there are two categories of policy-making bodies of the government, i. e., the framers of high policy, and the framers of lesser policy within the limits of high policy. The first category is usually understood to include the President, the NSC, the JCS, and such other bodies as are or may become responsible for formulating basic national policy. The framers of lesser policy are not so easily identified. They constitute a large, amorphous, and shifting category whose intelligence demands may range from the urgent to the relatively trivial.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

-2-

b) No authoritative, definitive statement has ever been made as to what bodies among these two categories of policy-makers should be directly supported by CIA. (The probability that almost all such bodies are indirectly supported by CIA need not concern the committee at this time, since indirect support does not involve production commitments.) However, the Reitzel Committee, after studying the basic documents pertaining to CIA's mission, concluded that the authoritative focus of ORE intelligence should be the highest policy-making level of government. This interpretation rests upon the standard definition of national intelligence as "integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one Department . . . , and transcends the exclusive competence of a single Department." Intelligence treating of the broad supra-departmental aspects of national policy and security is by its very terms intended to support the framers of high policy as distinguished from the framers of lesser policy within high policy limits.

c) In addition, the Reitzel Committee recognized that CIA was forced to engage in some forms of lower-level intelligence production which was not otherwise procurable, and which was necessary as a foundation for the higher-level production. However, the fact that CIA produces types of intelligence which are something less than "national" in character is the result of necessity rather than of direction or fixed responsibility.

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

-3-

d) Certain "services of common concern" are legal responsibilities of CIA. Only a portion of these services now include or are likely to include the production of intelligence. Such intelligence is in the nature of cartography, national intelligence surveys, or other types of a less than estimative character. In general, the intelligence product of these "services of common concern" does not directly serve the highest national policy level. To this extent only, then, CIA is charged with supporting a secondary level of policy within the government.

e) The foregoing discussion leads definitively to the conclusion that CIA's intelligence production is meant to support the highest policy-framing echelon of government, and that it should support lesser policy echelons only when it can do so without prejudicing its primary support mission, or when required to do so by law or agreement. It is suggested therefore that the committee agree at the outset that whatever plan it finally recommends be addressed only to the needs of the highest policy-making echelon of the government. This suggestion is made in full knowledge of the fact that CIA must produce intelligence of a less than "national" character, which undoubtedly should be planned. Since the latter type of intelligence furnishes indirect, rather than direct support to the highest policy level, the advisability of planning for it at this stage of the committee's work is somewhat questionable.

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-4-

3. a) If the committee agrees that CIA should direct its intelligence to the highest level of policy-makers, the next question that arises is: What kind of intelligence is needed by them? The question can be answered superficially by saying that top policy-makers need basic, current, and staff intelligence at various times and in differing degrees. However, this sort of answer brings the committee no nearer to solution of its planning problem.

b) The question can be answered much less superficially by examining the clear and most helpful "Anatomy of the Intelligence Process" contained in <sup>25X1A</sup> [REDACTED] paper of 26 January <sup>25X1A</sup> [REDACTED]. From the standpoint of the present discussion, the chief value of [REDACTED] "Anatomy" is that it throws light into some of the dark corners of basic, current, and staff intelligence, and selects in each of those broad fields the elements which are of interest to policy-makers, i.e.,

1) Analysis of bearing of significant patterns or trends on U. S. security interests.

2) Significant spot reports

3) Preliminary estimates

4) Broad estimates and projections.

c) Nevertheless, the question of what intelligence is needed by the highest policy-makers is still not completely answered until one establishes a more concrete basis of selection for intelligence of real value to them. The easiest basis for selection is a continual questioning

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**SECRET**

-5-

of policy-makers as to their needs. This has not been done in the past. The possibility of its being done in the future is uncertain. Even if it were to be done it might well, unless carefully handled, decrease the necessary qualities of imagination and national security consciousness in the intelligence production process.

d) A second basis of selection for intelligence is an examination of what policy-makers are responsible for. Among their diverse responsibilities those which appear most important from an intelligence support viewpoint are:

- 1) Assessment of U. S. foreign interest, risks, commitments, and objectives.

- 2) Establishment of U. S. policies.

- 3) Determination of U. S. courses of action.

e) From the foregoing responsibilities of top policy-makers, there can be deduced certain broad cognate intelligence functions which can be used as a guide for selection of proper national intelligence production. On the assumption that U. S. commitments, objectives, and policies are relatively well-known, these broad intelligence functions can be stated as follows:

- I. To identify those interests and risks which have enough actual or potential significance to cause or to warrant alterations in U. S. foreign commitments, objectives, or policies.

- II. To describe the probable effects of possible U. S. courses of action related to such identifications.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

III. In relation to such U. S. courses of action, to assess hostile, friendly, and neutral capabilities, including actual and probable courses of action, in the light of their objectives, vulnerabilities, and other determining factors.

f) If any of the foregoing functions has more importance than the others, it is the second. Essentially, the object of identifying U. S. risks and interests is to aid in determining if present courses of action are adequate, or if new ones are necessary. Again, the reasons for assessing foreign capabilities and courses of action are to determine if they necessitate new or altered U. S. courses of action.

g) Moreover, since the identification of U. S. foreign risks and interests can proceed on the policy as well as on the intelligence level of government, function (I) listed above is less essential from an intelligence support standpoint than functions (III) or (II). Therefore, although the order of derivation of the three intelligence functions is (I), (II), (III), the order of magnitude is (II), (III), (I).

h) The foregoing discussion of functions is intended to convey the thought that estimates treating of the probable effects of possible U. S. courses of action constitute the type of intelligence production, aside from urgent current intelligence, which is most valuable and most germane to the highest level of government. This type of production must be founded upon and coordinated with other

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

-7-

estimates concerning the identification of U. S. interests and risks, (function I above), and the assessment of foreign capabilities and courses of action (function III above).

i) It is recognized, of course, that the top policy echelon of government is interested in, and has requested intelligence estimates that fall chiefly under functions (I) and (III). This does not mean, however, that intelligence producers can conscientiously ignore function (II).

j) If the committee concurs in the foregoing statement of intelligence functions, it is suggested that they be adopted as a guide for planning, and that special attention be given to function (II), which appears to have been undervalued in past CIA production.

NOTE: The third question listed in paragraph 1 of the foregoing discussion will be treated in a separate paper.

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